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I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE concept of "instream flow" includes the use of water for a
variety of purposes. Navigation, water supply and sanitation,
as well as fish and wildlife purposes, have been recognized historically as requiring minimum stream flows. Recreational, aesthetic
and ecological uses are now recognized as equally important
water uses in a society whose perception of the value of the natural world is maturing.
In general, instream flows were not protected under the
water law doctrines adopted in either the eastern or western
states. The prior appropriations doctrine, the basic concept
adopted in the western states for the management and allocation
of state water resources, reflected the realities of the region.
These realities in the western states produced a "drought-driven
culture,"' The prior appropriations doctrine works well in providing certainty in times of shortage. 2 It does not work well in
protecting instream flows because the prior appropriations doctrine historically has required water to be diverted from a watercourse before a right to the water could be established. There
was little recognition or protection in prior appropriations doctrine states for nonconsumptive instream uses.
The riparian doctrine, the basic concept adopted in the eastern states, reflects the realities of a region blessed with abundant
water resources. It does not provide a basis for the management
and allocation of state water resources. In general, it requires
water to be used "reasonably" and limits water use to lands adjoining or overlying the water resource. Instream flows receive
even less recognition or protection in riparian doctrine states
than is afforded in prior appropriations doctrine states. The common law of England utilized a "natural flow" theory under which
riparian water users were prohibited from affecting adversely the
natural flow of a watercourse. In the United States, however, the
"natural flow" concept was replaced by a "reasonable use" con1. A. Dan Tarlock, Discoveringthe Virtues of Riparianism,9 VA. ENVTrL.

LJ. 249,

250 (1990).
2. Certainty in times of shortage is predicated on the basic provision of the
doctrine that "first-in-time" is "first-in-right."

With limited exceptions, the tem-

poral priority of the appropriation is controlling.
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cept in order to encourage economic development in the eastern
states. Absent state legislation, "reasonable use" does not include instream flows.
Both doctrines have been subject to substantial criticism.
Strictly construed, the prior appropriations doctrine can be exceedingly harsh, especially with regard to new water uses having
junior priorities. In addition, because the "beneficial use" test
has historically been an economic test, the doctrine is not well
suited to protect water uses (such as instream flows) that do not
have easily quantifiable economic benefits.
The riparian doctrine can be exceedingly vague. With limited exceptions, it does not provide a means by which specific
water uses may be either protected or regulated. It neither allows
water to be moved to higher valued uses nor does it protect environmental amenities. In addition, the riparian doctrine is predicated on the assumption that there is an abundant supply of
water. This may not be a valid assumption. Given instream flow
requirements, gradual climatic change and the contamination of
existing supplies, the eastern states may not have the abundant
water resources that were assumed to be available. 3 In fact, it has
been argued that the eastern states have continued to adhere to
the riparian doctrine precisely because those states have never
faced a severe water shortage. 4 Given the inevitability of such
shortages in the future, the inescapable conclusion is that the riparian doctrine has outlived its usefulness as a means of managing and allocating state water resources.
In fact, most of the eastern states have enacted new laws that
either amend or supersede the riparian doctrine. 5 As the eastern
states are moving away from the riparian doctrine, the western
states are moving away from a strict doctrine of prior appropriations. The resulting conceptual confluence finds the eastern
states adopting some aspects of the prior appropriations doctrine
while the western states temper that doctrine by adopting certain
3. Robert H. Abrams, Chartingthe Course of Riparianism:An Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381, 1405-23 (1989) [hereinafter Abrams,
Charting the Course]. This article was the first of a trilogy of articles by Prof. Robert H. Abrams on the future of riparianism in the eastern states. See also Robert
H. Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East: Consideringa
Move Away from Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255 (1990); Robert H. Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 93 (1989).
4. Abrams, Charting the Course, supra note 3, at 1383.
5. See generally George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law: Trends in State Legislation, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 287 (1990) [hereinafter Sherk, Trends).
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6
concepts that are historically riparian in origin.
Protection of instream flows is one area in which the confluence may be seen. This Article reviews legislation enacted in the
eastern and western states to protect instream flows in the context of the impacts of such legislation on existing rights to the use
of water. In essence, when does such legislation (including implementing regulations) constitute a taking of property rights? The
following section describes in general terms the instream flow
legislation that has been enacted. The requirements of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are discussed in Section III
as is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council.7 Given that all takings claims are factually
and case specific,8 Section IV examines five hypotheticals regarding the impacts of instream flow programs on existing water
rights. Conclusions are presented in Section V.

II.

INSTREAM FLOW LEGISLATION

Legislation to protect instream flows has been enacted in
both the eastern and western states. In the prior appropriations
doctrine states, for example, the diversion requirement has been
eliminated in Colorado, 9 Idaho,' 0 and Arizona." Legislation authorizing the reservation or withdrawal of water to protect in3
2
stream flows has been enacted in Alaska,' Oregon,' Montana,14
and Utah. 15 In addition, instream flows have been protected by
case law or statute in Washington,16 Wyoming, 17 North Dakota, 18
6. See generally George William Sherk, Meetings of Waters: The Conceptual Confluence of Water Law in the Eastern and Western States, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Spring 1991, at 3 [hereinafter Sherk, Meetings].
7. 112 S. Ct. 2886-(1992).
8. As the Court noted in Lucas: "In 70-odd years of succeeding 'regulatory
takings' jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any " 'set formula' " for determining how far is too far, preferring to 'engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries,' Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v. Town of Hempsted, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962))." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
9. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(4) (1990).
10. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4301, -4304, -4307 to -4312 (1989).

11.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 45-151 (1987).

12. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.030, .145 (1992).
13. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 536.410, 538.110-.300 (1989).
.14. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-316, -605 (1991).
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3(1 1) (Supp. 1992).

16.

WASH. REV. CODE

17. WYo.
18. N.D.

STAT.
CENT.

§ 90.22.010 (Supp. 1992).

§§ 41-3-1001 to -1014 (Supp. 1992).
CODE §§ 61-04-01.1.4, -06.1, -31 (1985 and Supp. 1991).
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and Nevada.' 9
While the western states integrate protection of instream
flows into the prior appropriations doctrine, 20 at least sixteen
eastern states have enacted legislation to protect such flows in the
context of legislation amending (or superseding) the riparian
doctrine. In fact, the protection of instream flows has been one of
the driving forces behind legislative activity in the eastern
2

states. 1
The preferred approach in the eastern states has been to authorize a branch of state government to establish minimum instream flows or water levels. Such legislation has been enacted in
24
Illinois, 25 West Virginia, 2 6
Florida,2 2 Indiana, 23 Mississippi,
27
28
Connecticut,
Tennessee,
New Jersey, 2 9 Wisconsin,3 0 and
19. State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev. 1988).
20. See generally Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 323, 326-30 (1990).
21. See generally William E. Cox, Protecting Instream Water Uses in a Riparian
Doctrine State: What Are the Options?, 2 RIVERS 113 (1991); Robin E. Truitt, Model
Legislation Providingfor Instream Uses of Water in Riparian Water Allocation Systems, 2
RIVERS 30 (1991).
22. The Water Management Districts are authorized to establish seasonal
minimum levels and flows for both surface and ground water. FLA. STAT.
ch. 373.042 (1988). The Districts are also authorized to develop criteria for the
establishment of minimum surface and ground water levels. FLA. STAT.
ch. 373.0395(4).
23. The Natural Resources Commission and the Department of Natural Resources are authorized to protect "naturally occurring" stream flows. IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 13-2-6.1-4(5), -6 (West 1987).
24. The Commission on Natural Resources is authorized to establish both
minimum instream flows and minimum lake levels. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-37(2), -7(3) (1990).
25. The Department of Transportation is authorized to establish minimum
stream flows and lake levels. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19, paras. 70, 70a (Smith-Hurd
1990).
26. The Chief of the Division of Water Resources, Division of Natural Resources, and the State Water Resources Board are authorized to implement the
Natural Streams Preservation Act. W. VA. CODE §§ 20-5B-2 to -17 (1989 &
Supp. 1992).
27. The Commissioner of Environmental Protection is authorized to establish stream flows in those streams that have been stocked by the state. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-141a, -141b (West 1990).
28. The Director of the Water Resources Division is authorized to determine the waters of the state that are reserved for instream flow purposes. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 69-8-103(5) (1987).
29. The Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection is
authorized to establish minimum water levels for both surface and ground water.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:lA-5(e) (West 1992).
30. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources is authorized to establish minimum stream flows and lake levels. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18(8) (West
1989).
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Virginia.
31
The legislation enacted in Virginia in 1989 is illustrative.
Use of the waters of the Commonwealth is restricted to beneficial
uses, the definition of which includes instream uses. 3 2 Flow conditions are to be maintained "to protect instream beneficial uses
and public water supplies." 3 3 Surface water management areas
may be established by the State Water Control Board in order to
protect instream beneficial uses.3 4 Permits for water use within a
surface water management area must include provisions to ensure
flow requirements as needed to protect instream uses.3 5 In addition, the Virginia legislation specifically authorized the Attorney
General of the Commonwealth to intervene in order to represent
the public interest in any litigation that concerned the use of surface water.3 6 Such representation would include the protection of
instream beneficial uses.
A more limited approach was taken in South Carolina where
legislation was enacted to protect instream flows by restricting the
amount of water available for transbasin diversions.3 7 Such diversions must leave a reasonable instream flow in the river from
which the diversion was taken. Similar restrictions were imposed
in Massachusetts regarding the quantity of water available for
withdrawal. 38 Ohio has prohibited diversions that have signifi39
cant adverse impacts on instream uses or existing water levels.
At the present time, at least twenty-six eastern and western
states have enacted legislation or have caselaw protecting instream flows. The need for such legislation is (or has been) the
31. The legislation was developed for the Virginia General Assembly by a
task force on which a variety of water users and interest groups were represented. The process led to a consensus proposal which, in turn, led to the enactment of the proposed legislation. Both the legislation and the process that led
to its enactment may become models for other states. See Richard C. Collins,
Sharing the Pain: Mediating Instream Flow Legislation in Virginia, 1 RIVERS 126
(1990).
32. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-10(b), 62.1-242 (1992).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-11.F.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-246.A. Issuance of permits under § 401 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), must respect instream beneficial
uses. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:5.B.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-248.A.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.23:1.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-21-30(C)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987). Legislation has
also been enacted in South Carolina that defines instream flow requirements as
"essential water uses" to be protected during drought conditions. S.C. CODE

ANN. § 49-23-70(c).
38. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21G, § 8 (West Supp. 1992).
39. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1501.32(B)(6) (Anderson Supp. 1991).
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40
subject of study in virtually every state.

III.
A.

THE STUMBLE OF STICKS

The First Principle: Takings Require Compensation

The first principle applicable to this discussion is that the taking of private property for a public purpose requires the payment
of compensation under both the United States Constitution 4 ' and
42
the constitutions of the states.
It is virtually certain that holders of water rights will seek
compensation when their rights are impacted adversely by state
programs to protect instream flows. What is uncertain is whether
their claims will have merit.
B.

The Second Principle: Water Rights Are Property

The second principle is that water rights are one form of
property. This is true irrespective of whether the right arises
under the prior appropriations doctrine4 3 or the riparian doctrine. 44 Under either system, the right to use water is a usufructuary right in that the owner holds a right to the use of the water.
The owner does not own the water. 4 5
"Water rights are property, but they have no higher or more
protected status than any other sort of property .... In fact water
40. The issue has also been the subject of study by the American Society of
Civil Engineers (ASCE). At the present time, an ASCE task force is preparing a
model state water allocation code. One of the provisions of that code will address instream flow requirements.
41. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42. The states "follow quite closely the precepts set down by the Supreme
Court" with regard to the taking of property and the requirement that just compensation be paid. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of
Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 259 (1990).
43. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK, LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES
§ 5.18 (1992).
44. Riparian water rights are "one component of the property interests
held by owners of land bordering or crossed by a natural body of water." Cox,
supra note 21, at 113.
45. Water rights are defined as follows
[A] right in the water rather than as ownership of the water as such ....
[Such rights are] a kind of real property, termed an incorporeal hereditament rather than a corporeal right because the flow of water itself cannot be owned or possessed. One can own only a right to use water as it
passes over, or lies upon, one's land.
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Part II: Riparianism, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 85,

380 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (footnotes omitted).
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rights have less protection than most other property rights" for at
least three reasons. 4 6 First, "because their exercise may intrude
on a public common, they are subject to several original public
prior claims, such as the navigation servitude and the public trust,
47
and to laws protecting commons, such as water pollution laws."
Second, "their original definition, limited to beneficial [or reasonable] and non-wasteful uses, imposes limits beyond those that
constrain most property rights." 4 8 Third, "insofar as water rights
(unlike most other property rights) are granted by permit, they
are subject to constraints articulated in the permits." 49 In es50
sence, riparian water rights are an "incomplete property right."
The same can be said for water rights arising under the prior appropriations doctrine.
C.

The Third Principle: Takings of Water Rights Require
Compensation

Incorporating the Fifth Amendment into the discussion of
water rights, therefore, is relatively simple. As with the taking of a
corporeal property right, the taking of a water right may require
the payment of compensation. 5 1 This is the third principle applicable to the discussion.
The obligation to provide compensation arises when the exercise of a state's police power constitutes "a taking in the constitutional sense." As discussed in Lucas, there are two situations
where this obligation arises: 1) in situations where regulations
"compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his
property.... ([A]t least with regard to permanent invasions), no
matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the
52
public purpose behind it, we have required compensation,"
46. Sax, supra note 42, at 260.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (footnote omitted).
50. Dellapenna, supra note 45, at 515 (citing A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF

WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.20[3], at 3-96 to 3-97 (1989)).
51. "[A] state cannot take vested property rights, whether corporeal or incorporeal, without paying 'just compensation ......
Dellapenna, supra note 45,
at 380 (footnote omitted).
52. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (citing Loretto v. Telepromoter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) (permanent physical occupation authorized by government is taking without regard to public interests that it may
serve); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (imposition of
navigation servitude on privately owned marina will result in actual physical invasion of marina and requires Government to pay compensation); United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-65 & n.10 (1946) (physical invasion of airspace
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and 2) compensation is also required when the effect of a governmental regulation "denies all economically beneficial or produc53
tive use of land."
In the second situation, diminution of value cases, the courts
have been "extremely deferential" to state regulators in determining each case's merits. Diminution in value of up to ninety
percent of the value of the property has been sustained as not
requiring the payment of compensation.5 4 The percentage may
now have increased to ninety-five percent of the value of the
property. 55 In essence, "when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property eco56
nomically idle, he has suffered a taking."
may constitute taking)); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 831-32 (1987) (taking occurs to extent of occupation without regard to
whether action achieves important public benefit or has only minimal impact on
the owner); Sax, supra note 42, at 262.
53. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980) (sustaining local efforts to protect open space); Nollan, 483 U.S. at
831-32; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987) (making its determination of whether compensation is required, Court
will consider several factors including economic impact of regulation, extent to
which regulation interferes with investment backed expectations, and character
of government action); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981) (sustaining legislation requiring amelioration of
impacts of strip mining)). The Court went on to conclude that "the Fifth
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.'"
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
54. Sax, supra note 42, at 262-63 & n. 18 (citing United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985) (sustaining provisions of Clean Water
Act intended to protect wetlands, Court concluded that "the mere assertion of
regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory
taking ....

Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to

prevent 'economically viable' use of the land in question can it be said that a
taking has occurred."); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(suggesting that test should be whether regulation completely extinguishes
value of property)).
55. As the Court stated in Lucas:
It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get
nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full. But
that occasional result is no more strange than the gross disparity between the landowner whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner whose property is reduced to 5% of
its former value by the highway (who recovers nothing). Takings law is
full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
56. Id. at 2895 (footnote omitted).
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The Fourth Principle: Water Rights May Be Regulated

Regulation of water rights can serve many purposes including protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources. To achieve these purposes, .water rights may be
regulated. This is the fourth principle.
Such regulation is consistent with the police power found in
the Constitution. 57 Several cases have upheld the constitutionality of legislation regulating water rights to protect natural resources. As one commentator has noted, "legislation that
constrains uses of property to achieve environmental protection
goals is firmly within the police power, as is legislation that constrains property use in order to conserve scarce natural resources
by requiring more efficient use." 5 8
E.

The Fifth Principle: Regulation Does Not Require
Compensation

The fifth principle is that governmental regulation of water
rights does not in general require the payment of compensation.
The claims of water rights owners for compensation have been
routinely denied and the denials have been sustained upon
59
appeal.
Regulation may also be applied retroactively, unlike many
laws. "It is not unconstitutional for regulation to constrain pre57. "[N]o property right can be exempted from the full exercise of the police power." Sax, supra;note 42, at 261 & n.7 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-10, at 618 (1988)).
58. Sax, supra note 42, at 262 & n. 12 (citing Riverside, 474 U.S. at 121; Hodel,
452 U.S. at 264; Agins, %447U.S. at 255; State v. Dexter, 202 P.2d 906, 908
(Wash.), aff'd, 338 U.S. 863 (1949) (sustaining mandatory reforestation requirement, court concluded that state is not "required by the constitution of the
United States to stand idly by while its natural resources are depleted ....
[W]here natural resources can be utilized and at the same time perpetuated for
future generations, what has been called 'constitutional morality' requires that
we do so.")).
59. "[T]he United States Supreme Court has been deferential toward state
regulation that adversely impacts on property rights, routinely denying the owners compensation.... Every major change in western water law, despite adverse
effects on existing claims of right, has been sustained as valid, non-compensable
regulation." Sax, supra note 42, at 259 n.4 (citing Town of Chino Valley v. City
of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1329-30 (Ariz. 1981), appealdismissed, 457 U.S. 1101
(1982) (Arizona Groundwater Management Act of 1980 did not "deny appellants due process of law and does not require that they be paid compensation for
any possible diminution of their rights which they may have had under the doctrine of reasonable use."); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968)
(sustaining state statute that required permit for use of ground water)); see also
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court:A Status Report, 7 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 139, 145-47 (1988).
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existing uses or rights that were legal when initiated. Retroactivity is not the test of compensability." 60
F.

The Sixth Principle: There Is No Clear Distinction Between
Regulation and Taking of Property

The sixth principle is painfully obvious: the distinction between reasonable regulation of the use of property (not requiring
compensation) and the taking of property (requiring compensation) is not readily discernible. "There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins." 6 '
There had been speculation (including roughly equal measures of fear and hope) that the decision of the Supreme Court in
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council 6 2 would more clearly define
the distinction between the reasonable regulation of property
rights and the taking of those rights. At issue in Lucas was a state
regulation prohibiting development of beachfront land that the
plaintiff had owned before the regulation became effective. The
landowner sought compensation, arguing that; the regulation in
fact constituted a taking of property. Despite; a ripeness problem, 63 the Court found that deprivation of all economically bene-

ficial use is a compensable taking unless the .use is prohibited
under state law. 6 4 The case was remanded both for a determination of the common law property and nuisance principles codified
60. Sax, supra note 42, at 260. With regard to land use cases, for example,
"[v]alid preexisting uses have been subject to rezoning and owners have been
required to change their use to conform to the new law." Id. at 265 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempsted, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (sustaining ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavations, Court concluded that "every regulation
necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise
of the town's police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most
beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional."); Queenside Hills Realty Co.
v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946) ("[Iun no case does the owner of property acquire
immunity against exercise of police power because he constructed it in full compliance with existing laws .... The police power is one of the least limitable of
governmental powers, and in its operation often cuts down property rights.");
Erie R.R. Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'n, 254 U.S. 394, 409-14 (1921)
(Holmes, J.) (public and private rights should be balanced when regulations
were challenged and public rights should prevail)).
61. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594.
62. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
63. Id. at 2890-92. The regulation at issue had been amended to allow the
issuance of special permits to build in certain circumstances. The amendments
were enacted after the case had been appealed to the Supreme Court. Id.
64. Id. at 2901-02. "[A] 'State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation .... ." Id. (quoting Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)). "Instead, as
it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action
for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background principles of nui-
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in South Carolina statutes and for an application of those principles to the facts of the case.
The Lucas decision affected only a narrow ban of regulatory

actions. It may be of little assistance in the majority of taking
cases likely to arise. It can be argued, since the property rights at
issue in Lucas were not water rights, that the decision will have
only limited applicability to instream flow and other water use
issues.
It is more likely that the decision will be directly applicable to
instream flow and other water use issues because the Court recognized and reaffirmed in Lucas that property rights are defined
both by state law and by underlying common law principles.
"Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of
all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not
65
part of his title to begin with."
Given the limitations on water rights discussed herein, particularly the "incomplete" nature of such rights, 66 it may be more
difficult for a claimant to sustain a claim for the taking of a water
right because of the "public servitudes" (such as navigation and
67
the public trust) that existed prior to the initiation of the right.
sance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found." Id.
65. Id. at 2899 (footnote omitted). The Court also concluded that the expectations of the owner of property should be "shaped by the State's law of
property--i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to
which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value." Id.
at 2894 n.7.
66. For a discussion of limitations on water rights, see supra notes 46-50
and accompanying text.
67. Application of the public trust doctrine to water resources derives from
the decision of the Supreme Court in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinios, 146 U.S. 387,
452-53 (1892), that concluded that "the general control of the State over lands

under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake ...
cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property"; see also Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). In McCarter, the Supreme Court
stated:
[Flew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent
of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain
the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by
such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit ....

This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State,

and grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and
we are of the opinion that the private property of riparian proprietors
cannot be supposed to have deeper roots. Whether it be said that such
an interest justifies the cutting down by statute, without compensation,
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As one commentator has noted, "[t]here is a tradition that recognizes a pre-existing right of the State in the flow of its rivers. Private diversions, at least those in tidal or navigable waters and
affected tributaries, have always been subject to a servitude and a
trust in favor of the public." 68 Specifically with regard to the regulation of riparian water rights, another commentator has concluded that "the public trust might itself be enough to uphold
almost any conceivable regulated riparian statute." 69 In essence,
"[t]he state is not 'taking' something belonging to an owner, but
is. asserting a right it has always held as a servitude burdening
70
owners of water rights."

IV.

HYPOTHETICALS

Every case involving a taking claim is unique. Consequently,
to understand the circumstances under which compensation may
be required for a taking of water rights, it is necessary to consider
a number of hypotheticals.
A.

Reservation of Water

In order to protect instream flows, a state redefines the "waters of the state" that are subject to appropriation and use by reserving to the state that quantity of water needed to fulfill
instream flow requirements. A riparian landowner asserts a taking claim.
In general, most challenges to instream reservations or ap71
propriations as affecting existing rights have been unsuccessful.
in the exercise of the police power, of what otherwise would be private
rights of property, or that apart from statute those rights do not go to
the height of what the defendant seeks to do, the result is the same....
The private right to appropriateis subject not only to the rights of lower owners,
but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great
foundations of public welfare and health.

Id.. at 356 (emphasis added).
68. Sax, supra note 42, at 269 (footnote omitted).
69. Dellapenna, supra note 45, at 517. At least nine eastern and western
states have recognized some form of the public trust doctrine as one means of
protecting the public interest in state water resources. In addition, definitions of
navigability have been expanded to include public uses and recreational values
in three other states. Sherk, Meetings, supra note 6, at 4.
70. Sax, supra note 42, at 280. This principle was reaffirmed in Lucas in the
context of "confiscatory regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land: Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated
or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2900.
71. Sax, supra note 42, at 259 n.4 (citing Colorado River Water Conserva-
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As discussed in the preceding section, the reservation could be
sustained either as an expression by the state of the quantity of
water required to protect the public trust or as the burden of the
navigation servitude. Alternatively, in a riparian doctrine state
the reservation could be viewed as a reasonable use of water by
the state. Given that all riparian water uses are subject to the reasonable use of water by other riparian landowners, the reservation could be sustained.
Since the state is appropriating the water to itself, however, a
taking claim might arise in a prior appropriations doctrine state if
the claimant could demonstrate that the quantity of water reserved by the state included a quantity of water for which the
claimant held a water right at the time of the reservation. In such
litigation, the burden of proof would rest with the claimant.7 2
B.

Registration of Water Uses

In a riparian state, the legislature enacts a bill that requires
all existing water users to register their uses within two years of
enactment. After the registration period has passed, new water
uses may be initiated only upon issuance of a state permit. Water
uses for which a permit was not obtained are presumed to have
been abandoned. The legislation precludes the issuance of a permit if the proposed water use would have an adverse impact on
instream flows. An owner of riparian land who was not using
water when the statute was enacted brings a taking claim.
At least nineteen eastern states have enacted similar permit
and registration requirements. 73 The extinguishment of unused
riparian rights has been upheld. For example, in Village of Tequesta
v. Jupiter Inlet Corp.,74 the Florida Supreme Court concluded that
"the landowner does not have a constitutionally-protected property right in the water beneath the property, requiring compensation for the taking of the water when used for a public
purpose." 75 In comparison to zoning regulations, the court
tion Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979) (constitutional challenge to legislation authorizing Colorado Water Conservation
Board to apply for water rights as needed to maintain streamflows was unsuccessful); Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924
(Idaho 1974) (constitutional challenge to Department of Parks appropriation of
water for recreational and scenic purposes rejected)).
72. Cox, supra note 21, at 115.
73. Sherk, Trends, supra note 5, at 294-98.
74. 371 So.2d 663 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979).
75. Id. at 672.
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stated that "the right to the use of water may also be limited or
regulated. "76
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rendered a similar decision in
Omernik v. Wisconsin,7 7 a case in which a state statute prohibiting
the diversion of water without a permit was challenged. In dismissing the plaintiff's challenge, the court concluded:
We see sec. 30.18, Stats., as the state's exercise of its police power to protect public rights and to prevent harm
to the public by uncontrolled diversion of water from
lakes and streams. While the statute does not secure for
the state a benefit not presently enjoyed by its citizens, it
does seek to prevent the public harm of dry riverbeds
replacing flowing streams ....
[T]he statute ". . . does
not create or improve the public condition but only preserves nature from the despoilage and harm resulting
78
from the unrestricted activities of humans."
As previously discussed, most western courts have held that
water must be diverted and applied to a beneficial use to be a
vested property right for compensation purposes. Consequently,
changes in state water laws that resulted in the abolition of unused riparian rights have been upheld. 79 "[Oinly actual uses existing at the time of the transition will be protected from a taking
without compensation." ' 0 The Supreme Court of the State of
Washington addressed the issue of the abolition of unused riparian rights in In re Deadman Creek DrainageBasin,8 ' and determined
82
that there had been no unconstitutional taking of property.
76. Id.
77. 218 N.W.2d 734 (Wis. 1974).
78. Id. at 743 (quoting Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 771
(Wis. 1972)).
79. Sax, supra note 42, at 259 n.4.
80. Dellapenna, supra note 45, at 516.
81. 694 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1985).
82. Id. at 1077. In reaching this conclusion, the court in Deadman Creek
summarized the decisions of several western courts regarding this issue. Id.
Washington was not the only state which provided for forfeiting unused riparian
rights. Id. The state of Texas also allowed termination of riparian rights for
nonuse through exercise of the police power. Id. (citing In re Adjudication of the
Water Rights of the Upper Guadalfpe Segment of the Guadalupe River Basin,
642 S.W.2d 438, 444-46 (Tex. 1982)). Several states also allow for termination
of groundwater rights for nonuse without providing compensation. Deadman
Creek, 694 P.2d at 1077 (citing Chino Valley v. Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1330
(Ariz. 1981); Williams v. Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595-96 (Kan. 1962), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968);
Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711-14 (S.D. 1964)). However, a contrary
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The presumption of abandonment contained in many of the
state statutes is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court
in Texaco v. Short,8 3 a case involving a challenge to the Indiana
Dormant Mineral Interests Act:
In ruling that private property may be deemed to be
abandoned and to lapse upon the failure of its owner to
take reasonable actions imposed by law, this Court has
never required the State to compensate the .owner for
the consequences of his own neglect. We have concluded that the State may treat a mineral interest that has
not been used for 20 years and for which no statement of
claim has been filed as abandoned; it follows that, after
abandonment, the former owner retains no interest for
which he may claim compensation. It is the owner's failure
to make any use of the property---andnot the action of the Statethat causes the lapse of the property right; there is no 'taking' that
requires compensation.84
C.

Drought Restrictions

Following the implementation of a state permit system, an
ongoing drought forces a riparian doctrine state to implement
mandatory water conservation measures. In order to protect instream flows, the state requires all permitted water uses to be reduced by ten percent. A group of water users challenges the
requirement as constituting a taking of their water rights.
Initially, it must be noted that riparian water rights are limited generally to reasonable uses. It has oft been said in both riparian and prior appropriations doctrine states that "[t]here is no
property right to waste water .... -85
Even if all of the uses were reasonable and there was no
waste of water by the claimants, the requirement would likely be
sustained as a reasonable exercise of the state's police powers.
The situation is not unlike Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
decision was reached by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Franco-American
Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., No. 59,310, 1990 WL 50192
(Okla. Apr. 24, 1991) (abolition of unused riparian water rights constituted taking of property).
83. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
84. Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
85. Sax, supra note 42, at 264 (citing A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589
P.2d 57, 60 (Colo. 1978) ("[The] right to water does not give the right to waste
it.")).
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DeBenedictis,8 6 in which the Court sustained a requirement that a
portion of coal to be mined remain in place in order to provide
support for overlying lands.
D.

Clean Water Act Certification

State legislation is enacted under section 401 of the Clean
Water Act 8 7 precluding certification of any activity that would
have an adverse impact on instream flows. Alleging a taking of
the right to use water absent compensation, an applicant whose
application was denied seeks judicial review.
It is unlikely that the disappointed claimant would prevail.
The police power of the state should be adequate to sustain denial of the request for certification.8" The state, however, must be
mindful of due process considerations.
E.

Mandatory Releases from Storage

A power company obtains all needed state and federal permits to construct a reservoir. Water stored in the reservoir is
used as cooling water for a coal-fired generating plant that the
power company constructs at the site. Because of the growth of
downstream diversions, a drought imperils the aquatic habitat existing in the river on which the power company's reservoir was
constructed. In response to the drought, the legislature authorizes the governor to declare a "water supply emergency" and
take whatever actions are needed. The governor then orders the
power company to release water from the reservoir in such quantities as are needed to meet instream flow requirements. The
power company challenges the governor's order as constituting
an uncompensated taking.
This situation may present a valid taking claim. "[T]he only
new water law regulation that would prima facie raise a taking
problem is a release requirement: requiring existing appropriators to make releases in order to augment instream flows for public purposes such as ecosystem protection and public
86. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).

87. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
88. As the Court concluded in Lucas, " 'regulation does not effect a taking if
it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests ..... .. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at
2897 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987),
& Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) & Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926)).
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recreation." 89 Nothing would prevent the state legislature, when
it enacted the legislation authorizing the governor to declare a
"water supply emergency" and to take needed actions, from providing for the payment of compensation in appropriate situations.
Such an approach may be significantly less expensive than the
subsequent litigation.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

In Tyler v. Wilkinson, 90 the natural flow theory that had arisen
in England and that had restricted the use of water gave way to a
reasonable use theory. Under the new theory, "reasonable uses"
of water resources by riparian landowners would be allowed subject to "reasonable uses" by other landowners similarly situated.
In the western states, riparian water rights gave way to the
prior appropriations doctrine. The need to adapt water law to
meet changing societal needs reflects a "tradition of change in
water law." 9 ' This tradition is ongoing.9 2 It is being expressed at
the present time in both eastern and western state efforts to protect instream flows.
In general, for the reasons discussed herein, these efforts will
not result in a taking of private property for which the payment of
compensation is required. Under certain circumstances, however, the payment of compensation may be mandated.
One final note. In City of Los Angeles v. Aitkin, 93 compensation
was required when the aesthetic value of property was diminished
as a result of the depletion of a water resource:
For the reason that the existence of Mono Lake in its
natural condition, with all of its attractive surroundings,
is the vital thing that furnishes to the respondents' marginal land almost its entire value, and that the draining
of the lake will nearly destroy the value of their properties and the incident littoral rights thereto, it seems clear
that the lake is not being used by the respondents for an
unreasonable or nonbeneficial purpose, but, upon the
contrary, that their use of the lake in its natural condition
is reasonably beneficial to their land, and the littoral
89. Sax, supra note 42, at 263.
90. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
91. Sax, supra note 42, at 267.
92. Id. at 267-69.
93. 52 P.2d 585 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
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rights thereof may therefore not be appropriated, even
for a higher or more beneficial use for public welfare,
94
without just compensation therefor.
In essence, under other circumstances, a failure to protect instream flows may also result in a taking of property.
94. Id. at 592.
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